Multilevel secure transaction processing has been weil explored in the past decade. Despite this research, the proposed secure concurrency control protocols are not completely satisfactory because of the stringent constraints imposed by multilevel security. In this paper, we argue that modeling a transaction as an extended transaction model could significantly reduce the performance penalty. We accomplish this by minimizing (1) the probability ofrestarting a high security level transaction; and (2) the portion of the transaction to be reexecuted, when a restart becomes inevitable. In particular, we exploit the non-flat nature of transactions by identifying dependencies among various components of a transaction and portraying a transaction as an advanced transaction model. We demonstrate, via formal proofs, that our approach preserves the semantics of the transaction, and our concurrency control algorithm guarantees serializability.
INTRODUCTION
Access control requirements on sensitive data can be broadly classified into two categories: (1) discretionary access control (DAC) , in which users, at their discretion, are allowed to grant permissions on the data they own, and (2) mandatory access control (MAC), in which all data are labeled based on their level of sensitivity and all users are given clearances, where users are allowed to access data with a given label only if their level of clearance pennits them. Although many commercial applications employ DAC, it is not adequate where more stringent security requirements are needed as they are vulnerable to sophisticated attacks, such as Trojan Horse Attacks. Such application domains call for multilevel secure (MLS) systems that enforce MAC.
DATABASE AND APPUCATJON SECURITY XV
The area of transaction processing in multilevel secure (MLS) database management systems (DBMSs) has substantially progressed in the past few years. The major emphasis of this progress can be seen in secure concurrency control, one of the essential components of secure trans action processing. Concurrency control aims at synchronizing the operations of concurrent transactions to ensure correct execution.
Despite the substantial research activity, the proposed secure concurrency control protocols are not completely satisfactory because of the stringent constraints imposed by multilevel security. Researchers have proposed trans action processing protocols, in particular, concurrency control protocols using locking, timestamping, hybrid (combination of locking and timestamping) techniques. Other solutions try to tackle this difficult problem by maintaining multiple versions of data. Unfortunately, these solutions do not meet all the requirements of a secure concurrency control protocol; they trade either performance or recency for achieving security.
More specifically, the problem with the secure transaction processing is that if a data conftict between a low security level transaction and a high security level transaction should occur, for security reasons, the conftict must always be resolved in favor of the low security level transaction. In other words, the low level transaction has the right of way, whereas the high level transaction is hindered or restarted.
In the cases where a trans action has to be restarted, some solutions require that all of the transaction's effects must be undone and then the trans action is reexecuted from the beginning [1]. Other solutions reexecute starting from the first low read operation [7, 4] . These approaches however, cause resource wastage and in some cases results in starvation of high security level trans actions. Much of the prior research in this area has been limited to the traditional transaction concepts.
Motivated by the need forreleasing the rigidity, traditional transaction models have been extended in various directions. The objective of this paper is to investigate how the properties of the extended trans action models can be utilized to yield better secure concurrency control solutions for MLS DBMSs.
We have recognized that modeling a transaction as an extended trans action model, in particular as a workftow model, could reap significant gains in performance. In our work, we explore mechanisms that are specifically tailored for reducing the performance penalty to be paid for restarts by designing protocols such that (1) the probability of restarting a high security level transaction is minimum; and (2) even when arestart becomes inevitable, the portion of the trans action to be reexecuted is minimum. This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce the preliminaries of our extended transaction model and the security model. In section 3, we review the related work in this area. In section 4, we present an overview of our extended transaction model approach. In section 5, we present our secure concurrency control algorithm using the extended transaction model. Proofs of correctness that demonstrate that our redesign algorithm does indeed generate extended transactions that are equivalent to the original transactions, and the concurrency control algorithm guarantees (one-copy) serializability, have been omitted in this paper due to space limitations. Finally, in section 6, we summarize the results and discuss future work.
THEMODEL
In this section, we present our extended transaction model, and review the multilevel security model. Our approach assurnes multiple versions of data and reHes on the multiversion serializability theory reviewed in [7] .
Extended Transaction Model
Driven by the needs of advanced application domains such as design, engineering, manufacturing and commerce, several extended transaction models have been proposed [6] . Many of these models recognize the fact that the transactions are not always ftat. Some such extended models include nested transactions and workftow transactions. There has been an established model of nested trans action processing [3] , which describes the way to ensure the correctness under the scenario where a transaction is split-up into various subtransactions. Splitting of a transaction into subtransactions based on semantic information is described in [2, 12] . Thus, in an extended transaction model, a transaction can be chopped into meaningful subtransactions, where there exist dependencies among them. In this paper, we recognize two types of dependencies among subtransactions within a transaction: data dependency and value dependency. In addition, we recognize another type of dependency between different transactions.
In the following, we develop the necessary formalism of the extended trans- Although several types of control-ftow dependencies may be defined based on the above states and primitives [5] , in this paper, we use the following two.
Tij
Tkl: This states that Tkl begins only ifTij enters a "done" state. 
Multilevel Security Model
We assume the security structure to be a partially ordered set S of security levels with ordering relation A class Si E S is said to be dominated by another class Sj ES if Si Sj.
Let D be the set of all data objects. Each data object d E D is associated with a security level. Every transaction Ti is associated with a security level.
We assume that there is a function L that maps all data objects and tasks to security levels. That is, for every d E D, L(d) E S, and for every trans action Ti E W, L(Ti) E S. We require every transaction to obey the following two security properties -the simple security and the restricted *-property.
A transaction
In addition to these two restrictions, aseeure system must prevent illegal information ftows via covert channels.
RELATED WORK
Secure concurrency control with traditional transaction models has been weil understood [8, 1, 7, 9, 10] . In the following, we only review the solutions that are closely relevant to our work. The protocol proposed by Keefe and Tsai [8] uses a priority queue where transactions are placed in the queue based on the security level of the transaction. A transaction is assigned a timestamp that is smaller than all active transactions executing at lower security levels.
As a result, a high transaction's read operation does not interfere with a low transaction's write operation since the high transaction is considered as an older trans action though it arrives later than the low transaction. Although this requires a trusted code for implementation, it ensures one-copy serializability (the usual notion of correctness when multiple versions are maintained in the database) without compromising security. Moreover, transactions are never subjected to starvation. However, high transactions are sometimes given stale versions of the low data.
The protocol proposed by Jajodia and Atluri [7] assigns timestamps to transactions as in a conventional timestamp ordering protocol. According to this protocol, transactions are sometimes made to wait for their commit. Whenever a high transaction reads low data, it is not allowed to commit until alilow transactions with smaller timestamps than that of itself commit. This is because a low level transaction with a smaller timestamp can always invalidate the read operation of the high transaction by issuinga write. In such an event, the high transaction is reexecuted. This protocol guarantees one-copy serializability, is secure, and free of starvation. In addition, it can be implemented with completely untrusted code. Restarting a transaction may have significant impact on performance, especially if they are not short lived.
Researchers have proposed other solutions that compromise correctness for ensuring security. Jajodia and Atluri [7] have proposed three increasingly stricter notions of correctness for multiversion multilevel databases -levelwise serializability, one-item read serializability and pairwise serializabilitythat are weaker than one-copy serializability.
Bertino et al. [4] proposed a lock-based scheme for implementing transactions in a multilevel secure file storage system. Assuming the availability of a trusted lock manager and a trusted file manager, they implement a covertchannel-free MLS system. The main contribution of their work is the introduction of a "signal lock" along with the usual read lock and write lock in a 2PL scheme. They do assume a single version for each data item and use strict 2PL for concurrency control for transactions at the same security level. A high-level transaction intending to read a low-level data item obtains a signal-lock on the item. If the item is already write-Iocked by a low-Ievel trans action, then the high-transaction has to wait until the write-Iock is released. A low writer however does not need to wait when a data item is signal-Iocked by a high-level reader. In addition, they provide language primitives by which a high-level trans action can roll-back to a prespecified step when it receives a signal from the low-level indicating that the data item that it read has now been written. A trans action can then rollback to the state prior to the read statement. Similar strategy is also explained by Ray et al. in [11] . Both the approaches in [4, 11] incur the same penalty in performance as that in [7] .
Our work deviates from prior work significantly. The novel part of our work is that we exploit the non-ftat nature of transactions by identifying the dependencies among various components of a transaction. In other words, we redesign a transaction and model it as an advanced trans action model. As a result of this redesign, we can minimize the number of restarts or even unnecessary rollbacks to a prior save-state.
OVERVIEW OF THE EXTENDED TRANSACTION MODEL APPROACH
Our approach to achieve efficient execution of multilevel transactions relies on first recognizing the data dependencies among the various operations (sets of operations), and the non-ftat nature of the transaction.
As mentioned in section 1, the goal of our approach is to reduce the amount of reexecution of the transaction when restart becomes inevitable. In the following, we describe three cases where such optimizations are possible. In the first case, arestart is necessary, however, the transaction need not have to be restarted in full. In the second case, a particular data modification by a low security level transaction does not necessitate any form of corrective action by a high security level transaction. In the third case, a data modification may require some corrective action, but the compensatory action is pre-specified and can be efficiently accomplished than by restarting the transaction. All these three techniques can also be used in conventional transaction processing systems. However, we expect that using them in the secure transaction processing scenario will significantly enhance the performance.
Exploiting non-f1at nature of a transaction
Let us consider a transaction Tl with subtransactions and dependencies as shown in Figure 1 . As can be seen, the subtransaction T17 comprises of read [x] where L(x) < L(Tt}. Suppose Tl reads x. But, Tl may have to be reexecuted due to a confticting operation by a lower level transaction to ensure serializable execution. In such a scenario, not all parts of the transaction need to be reexecuted.
low Figure 1 . An example of partial reexecution
Our approach exploits the dependencies among subtransactions so that only those subtransactions which are effected by the modified low data item are reexecuted. For example, in Figure 1 , subtransactions T l1 , T 12 , T16, T 18 and T 19 are not required to be reexecuted for ensuring correctness since the change in the value of x does not affect those subtransactions.
Exploiting the value dependencies among subtransactions
Consider the scenario featured in Figure 2 . Depending on the value of x, the transaction could folIoweither the execution sequence A (T18, T 1 9) or the sequence B (T13, Tl4, T1 5 ). Now assurne that the value of x is 5 when the high level transaction begins its execution. Since the condition x < 20 is satisfied, the transaction follows the sequence A. Now if the value of x was changed to 6 at a later point oftime due to a lower security level transaction, the transaction need not roll back since the condition x < 20 still holds. Therefore, by modeling this as a value dependency, one may evaluate the condition and thereby avoid reexecution entirely, and reexecute it only when it is necessary. 
Employing compensating subtransactions
Now consider the case in Figure 3 . In this case, the value of x changes from 6 to 10, while the transaction is executing. In a conventional scenario, this requires a trans action restart. However, the restart could be prevented here by executing a compensating module. We realize that devising a compensating action is much more difficult, and moreover, some subtransactions may not be compensatable. In this paper, we do not address this issue.
Example
In the following, we present an example where the dependencies introduced in section 2.1 exist among a real-world database scenario. Consider a corporate database that contains several types of information about its employees: social security number, name, address, rank, years of service, weekly pay (p), number of hours worked per week (h), number of overtime hours worked per week (0), hourly rate (r), additional compensation (c), yearly bonus, etc. The information That is there will not be any Based on the semantics of the transaction, the dependencies as shown in Figure 4 can be seen among the operations within a transaction. Note that there exist both data dependencies as weIl as value dependencies. ii Restructure Ti according to the restructuring algorithm.
PROPOSED CONCURRENCY CONTROL ALGORITHM
3 Each version Xj of a data item x has a read timestamp rts(xj) and a write timestamp wts (x j) associated with it. We assurne there is an initial trans action To that writes into the database with rts(xo) = wts(xo) = ts(To). the followmg: 0i x ---'t mc counterk]
Definition 4 We say that a transaction T is semantically equivalent to another trans action T', (i) if the set of data operations of both T and T' are equaI, and (ii) if the values read by each read operation in both T and T' are the same, then the values written by each write operation in T and T' are the same.
Theorem 1 [Proof of Equivalence] Let T be a transaction. Let T' be the restructured trans action using algorithm 2. Then T' is semantically equivalent toT.
Theorem 2 [Proof of Correctness] Let H be a multiversion history produced by algorithm 1. Then H is one-copy serializable. In fact, H is equivalent to a one-serial history in which transactions are placed in a timestamp order.
5.1.

Discussion According to
Step 2(c) of algorithm 1, the restructuring of a trans action is done only if a transaction reads from low. Otherwise, it is executed as a ftat transaction. If it reads from low, the first step of algorithm 2 is to exploit the partial order of the operations and the data dependencies among them. In the second step of algorithm 2, we add counters to make sure that the operations are redone only if the condition has changed since the prior read. Let us consider various cases:
1. Suppose the schedule in the above example is
Then the read2[0] operation is redone after writel[o] because of the "bd" dependency, as shown in Figure 5 . Therefore this will result in a serializable schedule.
2. Suppose the schedule is
The above read2[0] is in fact the one triggered by writel [o] . This is also correct. So by adding these two dependencies, it makes sure that the write of low precedes the read of low if it hasn't already occurred in that order. That is, only the out-of-order read operation is redone but not all. This way, we are saving on the number of redoes. The dotted arrows indicate the added dependencies between transactions according to step 2(c)(i) of algorithm 1. Moreover, according to step 1 of algorithm 2, only parts of the transaction are to be redone, but not all. Now the idea of the second step of the restructure algorithm is to provide further optimization. The objective is to exploit the nature of the value dependency to avoid the redoing certain parts of the transaction by examining the value. For example, during the high trans action execution, the low value of "0" has changed. This does not have to necessarily trigger a redo. Consider the value read by read[o] is 10. Now it has changed to 15. This should not have any effect on the redoing part, and tberefore, the write[p] operation (in Figure 6) does not have to redone. This is accomplished by incorporating counters in that patb and incremented whenever transaction executes that part of tbe transaction. 
Implementation
Tbe proposed system can be implemented in several ways. Here, we describe one such implementation. We assume that our system is implemented using the kemelized architecture. Tbus, both the transaction manager (TM) and tbe Scbeduler are untrusted. (We assume the functionalities of algoritbms 1 and 2 are implemented in the TM and the scheduler. When a new transac-tion is received by the appropriate level TM, it assigns the transaction a unique timestamp by reading from a clock at system low. We assurne that the granularity of the clock is high enough so that the timestamps are unique among the transactions at all the security levels.
A TM, upon receiving a trans action, invokes its redesign module. This module first identifies the low-Ievel reads, and their dependencies with write operations at its own level. It builds both the value and data dependencies among the operations, as per algorithm 2. We refer to this as the dependency graph for a transaction. At this stage, however, there is no knowledge of the actuallowlevel transactions that the high-level transaction under consideration may be in conflict with. The TM, now, sends low-Ievel read requests to the scheduler at its level. Since we assurne a timestamp-based concurrency control, each read request is associated with a timestamp of the transaction that originated it. Accordingly, the scheduler selects the value of the latest version whose write timestamp is smaller than that of the transaction issuing the read request. Tb read requests are then sent to the trusted OS to retrieve the data from the appropriate DB (as in a kernelized architecture). In addition to the data, the request also reads the active transaction log maintained by the scheduler, and determines the active transactions and their timestamps that conflict with its own read. (An active transaction is one that has started but not yet terminated.) Thus, the low-Ievel read request returns the data value, its timestamp, and a set (possibly empty) of active low-Ievel transactions that conflict with the high-level read.
The high-level TM, after receiving the transaction sets from the low-Ievel read operations, saves them for use at the time of transaction commit. Actually, it is only concerned with low-Ievel transactions with timestamps smaller than the high-level transaction and with read-write conflicts. Let us call this set the active-transaction set (ATS). At the time of transaction commit, the TM needs to determine the state of the transactions in the ATS. Accordingly, it sends "read-Iog" request to the low-Ievel DBMS through the TCB. In return, it is presented with the current list of low-Ievel active transactions. If none of the transactions in its ATS are still active, then it proceeds with the next step of examining the dependency graph. Otherwise, it waits and repeats the above two steps periodically. When all transactions in the active-set have terminated, the high-level TM resends alilow-Ievel read operations to the low-Ievel scheduler. When the new values are returned, it checks with the dependency graph to determine the operations that need to be reexecuted. Tbe reread values are used for both data and value dependencies.
In summary, our implementation uses untrusted TMs and schedulers at each security level, logs maintained by the schedulers indicating the current active transactions and their read-and write-sets, and multiple versions of data items.
SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we described an extended model for multilevel secure transaction processing. In a traditional MLS model, a high-level transaction is aborted and restarted whenever its low-Ievel reads conftict with low-Ievel transactions' writes. This is often a concem for high-level users in real systems. Here, we suggest a way to extend the rigid transaction model by using some of the workftow transaction redesign techniques. The proposed scheme uses timestamping as a means of concurrency control. In addition, it employs multi version data. It employs value and data dependencies to identify the relationship between low-Ievel read data and high-level writes within a transaction. This information is then used at the time of trans action commit. Depending on the confticts during execution between a high-level transaction and low-Ievel transactions, only some parts of a high-level transaction may need to be reexecuted. But what parts, if any, are to be reexecuted is determined by the data and value dependencies identified earlier and the actual confticts and data values. We show the correctness of the proposed scheme by proving the serializability of the resulting transaction histories.
In the future, we plan to evaluate the performance of the proposed method in terms of the throughput offered at higher security levels as weIl as the response time. We also plan to measure the additional protocol overhead imposed by the proposed system, especiaIly the cost of maintaining additional versions of data, the list of active transactions, and the cost of active transaction enquiry and reread of low-Ievel data. The costs and benefits will be compared with those of a traditional scheme where a high-level transaction is simply aborted when its low-read operation confticts with a low-Ievel write operation. In addition, we plan to compare the performance of our scheme with other schemes [11, 4] that have similar objectives.
